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Introduction 
The post-Cold War instability in the former Soviet space allowed an enlarged involvement of 
the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) as a promoter of dialogue 
and confidence in the area. Focusing on conflict prevention, crisis management and post-
conflict rehabilitation as preferential areas of activity and embracing 55 states, the OSCE is 
the widest European security organisation, usually described as ranging from Vancouver to 
Vladivostok. This enlarged membership, including all former Soviet republics, has made it a 
privileged forum to address problems in the area, particularly through the deployment of field 
missions.  
The organisation’s activity in the former Soviet space is affected by the Russian 
positioning within and towards the organisation. While the OSCE has to promote its own 
principles and conciliatory procedures it also has to conciliate these principles, to which 
Russia became committed, with Russian aspirations and national interests, which in several 
instances have became irreconcilable goals.   
This article aims at analysing the OSCE-Russia relationship in the context of the Chechen 
problem, addressing its cooperative versus competitive dimensions and framing it in the broad 
formulation of Russian policy. To which extent is the OSCE role in the area strengthened or 
downgraded by the Russian Federation? Does the OSCE in some way constrain Russian 
actions in Chechnya, a self-proclaimed republic within the Russian Federation? How does the 
balancing of commitments and interests takes place? In searching answers for these questions, 
this article envisages to shed light on the complex OSCE-Russia relationship, particularly 
with regard to the Chechen problem, suggesting possible ways ahead. 
 
 
                                                          
1
 Las opiniones expresadas en estos artículos son propias de sus autores. Estos artículos no reflejan 
necesariamente la opinión de UNISCI. The views expressed in these articles are those of the authors. These 
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1. The “ups-and-downs” of a complex relationship 
The Russian position within and towards the OSCE has been ambiguous. Russia has at times 
been cooperative and sought the strengthening of the OSCE, to the extent of expecting to raise 
the organisation’s status to that of primacy among other international organisations 
(particularly to the detriment of NATO). At other times, Moscow has revealed distrust for a 
powerful OSCE and has limited the organisation’s reach and decision-making power. This 
ambiguity has been clear with regard to the OSCE activities in the former Soviet area, and in 
particular pertaining the organisation’s involvement in Chechnya. Politico-military, strategic 
and economic considerations sustain the Russian position. In addition, the formulation of 
Russian domestic and foreign policy directly impacts in its relationship with the OSCE, either 
strengthening the organisation or blocking its activities. 
At Istanbul in 1999, the OSCE states adopted the “Charter for European Security”2, 
understood as the “backbone” of the organisation. Resulting from a Russian suggestion, it 
should contribute to the development of civil societies based on common values and a 
comprehensive understanding of security, setting the OSCE competencies and potential in the 
alphabet soup of European organisations. However, Russian military intervention in 
Chechnya in 1999 and the violent combats that followed raised concerns in the west as 
regards the proclaimed democratic orientation of the Russian Federation as well as of its 
peaceful efforts to resolve disputes. Moreover, at the same meeting much “inventive 
diplomacy” and long hours of negotiation were needed for Russia to accept the OSCE right of 
intervention, in particular as regards Chechnya. This bargaining demonstrates how easily 
Moscow dismisses western criticism and how the western unwillingness to impose sanctions 
on the Russian Federation reveals the limited western ability to affect the policies of 
strategically relevant states. 
The 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States have had wide 
repercussions, particularly regarding the global fight against terrorism. Russia was not an 
exception, and very much welcomed this international effort, offering its contribution and 
finding here legitimacy to its interventionist approach in the Chechen affair. In this context, 
Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov argued the OSCE was entering a new phase and that it “should 
play a far more prominent role in the security architecture of Europe and find adequate 
answers to the current security threats, mainly terrorism and organised crime”.3 However, 
Ivanov clarified that the OSCE could only be effective if it took into account the interests of 
all participating states, criticising selective approaches as undermining the basic principles of 
the organisation’s functioning. In January 2004, the OSCE-Russia relationship was described 
as “frosty”. While Russia accused the organisation of double-standards regarding the way it 
treated the issues as “west of Vienna or east of Vienna”, the OSCE states increasingly blamed 
Moscow for not complying with its obligations, making it largely responsible for the 
organisation’s inability to resolve a number of long-lasting problems.  
The lack of consensus on a final document at the last two Ministerial Meetings of the 
OSCE (Maastricht in December 2003 and Sofia in December 2004) owing to Russian 
intransigence over the inclusion of any allusion to its unfulfilled commitment of withdrawing 
Russian military forces from Moldova and Georgia, is an example. Moscow’s intransigence, 
particularly in the case of Georgia, relates to Russian complaints about Chechen terrorist 
                                                          
2
 OSCE Charter for European Security, Istanbul, SUM.DOC/1/99, November 1999. 
3
 “OSCE: Security issues dominate meeting between Mr. Ivanov and Mr. Geoana in Moscow”, OSCE Press 
Release, 23 October 2001. 
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operations being conducted from its neighbour country, despite Georgian claims against such 
accusations. By not allowing the adoption of a political document at the most important 
yearly meeting of the organisation, the Russian Federation has clearly shown the disregard for 
the OSCE every time the adoption of a decision within its institutional framing might directly 
impinge upon its interests. However, “the objective of defusing divisions among participating 
states should not be achieved at the expense of downgrading monitoring standards or 
softening existing OSCE commitments”.4  
Nevertheless, and despite the rhetoric, Russian representatives continued to affirm their 
support to the OSCE, regarding the organisation as “an indispensable pillar of the new all-
European security architecture, with common values and norms of behaviour for all states”.5 
Contradictory statements and positions which render further complexity to an already 
complex relationship. The “Russian malaise” within the OSCE has been clear, as 
demonstrated by the gradual downgrading of the organisation within Russian politics, 
matched by the reverse affirmation of Russian interests and of a powerful image of the 
country, incarnated by President Vladimir Putin: the realist, pragmatic and sometimes 
assertive character of the Kremlin’s politics at work. The main criticisms pertain the OSCE’s 
concentration on the Caucasus and Central Asia as well as the organisation’s inefficiency and 
appliance of double standards. Thus, the pragmatism associated to the Putin administration 
has not been enlarged to the Russia-OSCE relationship, which continues to suffer from the 
“love-hate” dichotomy, as made clear in the Chechen affair.  
Despite not being an independent republic in the former Soviet area, Chechen 
secessionism within the Russian Federation means a source of instability in the already 
unstable Caucasus. Eliciting a repressive reaction from Moscow, accompanied by measures to 
appease the international community, such as allowing OSCE involvement, the case of 
Chechnya is a good example of how the ambiguities in the OSCE-Russia relationship affect 
and are a reflex of the difficulties in bridging commitments and interests. 
 
1.1. Chechnya, Russia and the OSCE 
In 1991, Dzhokar Dudayev and his supporters seized power in the republic of Chechnya by 
military means. The Russian government never recognised the Chechen independence or the 
election of Dudayev as Chechnya’s President (October 1991) and ultimately intervened in the 
republic to restore order, leading to the outbreak of armed conflict in December 1994. 
Between 1994 and 1996 Russian military and Chechen separatists were involved in violent 
combats. Besides intending to avoid the success of the separatist attempt, the Russian 
incursion in the republic had two main goals: the desire to control Caucasian oilfields and 
pipeline routes (especially in the oil rich and industrialised Sunzha valley), and a way of 
diverting attention from internal politics. The Chechen rebels pursued independence from the 
Russian Federation as a nationalist goal against a mal-functioning administration and with the 
aim of ameliorating the general living conditions in the republic.  
                                                          
4
 Victor-Yves Ghébali, “The Russian factor in OSCE crisis: A fair examination”, Helsinki Monitor, Vol. 16, No. 
3, 2005, p. 187. 
5
 “Russian Federation is ‘strong advocate’ of OSCE cause”, Interview with Alexander Alekseyev, Head of 
Delegation of the Russian Federation to the OSCE from August 2001 to early 2004. OSCE Magazine, Vol. 1, 
No. 2 (May 2004), p. 17. 
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It was in this context of instability that the OSCE states decided in April 1995 on the 
deployment of the Assistance Group to Chechnya, with Russian consent.6 The OSCE mandate 
included two main dimensions involving human activities and a crisis management role. The 
Group was entrusted of promoting respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, 
fostering democratic institutions and processes, assisting in the preparation of possible new 
constitutional arrangements and monitoring elections, ensuring the safe return of refugees and 
displaced persons, and facilitating the delivery of humanitarian aid. As concerns its crisis 
management role, the OSCE Group would become engaged in mediation activities together 
with the Russian Federation and the local authorities aiming at the promotion of a peaceful 
resolution of the crisis and the stabilisation of the situation. This should be accomplished 
through dialogue, respect for the territorial integrity of Russia and in accordance with OSCE 
principles. In the pursuit of its tasks, the Group would enjoy freedom of movement and be 
allowed to freely establish relations with civilian and military representatives as well as 
individual members wishing to contact the Group.  
The OSCE Group in Chechnya faced many restraints to its actuation, derived both from 
endogenous and exogenous factors. Inner constraints relate to the proper functioning of the 
mission in the field, with a strength of six people and a broad mandate to implement. In 
addition, not always the relationship between the mission members and the local authorities as 
well as with the Russian Federation was positive, rendering its work more difficult. 
Misinterpretation of the mission’s mandate, and personal threats to OSCE officers, including 
attacks against the Group’s premises in Grozny in the fall of 1995 and in August 1998, are 
example. These led to the Group’s withdrawal from Chechnya in view of the high level of 
insecurity, which prevented the mission from pursuing the tasks envisaged in its mandate. 
This latent tension was evinced in the parties’ perceptions about the OSCE’s involvement. 
At first the Chechen authorities demonstrated satisfaction with the Assistance Group’s 
activities, expressing interest in the support the Group could offer with regard to post-conflict 
rehabilitation, in particular the reconstruction of the economy and infrastructures, and the 
training of public officials. However, soon this positive attitude gave place to harsh criticism. 
While the Chechens welcomed the OSCE presence as a way of internationalising their cause, 
they criticised the organisation for supporting a solution which respects the territorial integrity 
of the Russian Federation, thus not precluding independence for the region. Moreover, the 
OSCE’s lack of visible action and of clear criticism towards Russian human rights violations 
in the republic has enraged the Chechen leadership.7 In 1997 the OSCE personnel was ordered 
out of the republic by the Chechens, after the Head of the OSCE Group, Tim Guldiman, 
having made a comment about Chechnya still being part of the Russian Federation. A tense 
situation that worsened with the resumption of armed hostility in 1999, not guaranteeing 
safety conditions for the mission members.  
The second Chechen war, as it became known, implied more difficulties to the OSCE 
involvement. While during the first war, the OSCE facilitation and mediation efforts produced 
visible results, the same cannot be said after 1999, with increasing constraints being placed on 
the organisation’s decision-making and implementation efforts, particularly by Moscow. For 
example, in the summer of 1995 the OSCE was successfully involved in the negotiations for 
the release of over a thousand people in Budenovsk, made hostages by the Chechen rebel 
                                                          
6
 16th OSCE Permanent Council (PC) Meeting, PC.DEC/35, 11 April 1995; 14th PC Meeting, PC.DEC/31, 29 
March 1995. 
7
 Roman Khalilov: “A Deadly Silence”, in http://www.ichkeria.org/a/2002/2/com2702-en23940.html, 27 
February 2002. 
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Shamil Basaev in a local hospital over demands for the resumption of negotiations regarding 
the conflicting situation in Chechnya; or even more regarding assistance in the negotiations 
leading to the August 1996 Khasaviurt Agreements which paved the way for presidential and 
parliamentary elections in the republic. Ballots that the OSCE monitored and which 
reportedly were consistent with international standards, and in which Aslan Maskhadov was 
elected and recognised as Chechen president, including by the Russian authorities. 
Nevertheless, Maskhadov’s inability to impose rule and order, and the chaotic situation that 
ensued in the republic led to Russian armed intervention in 1999, triggering a new conflict 
still unresolved. 
The crisis management activities of the OSCE Group have thus encountered many 
difficulties, resulting from the limited power of persuasion of the OSCE along with reluctance 
from the parties to allow flexibility in their irreconcilable positions. While the Chechens 
demand independence, Russia refuses to confer them such status. In addition, Russia has 
imposed many restrictions on the OSCE’s mediation role. Russian acquiescence to the 
deployment of the OSCE Group in Chechnya was a demonstration of the Russian desire to 
appease the international community while enhancing the OSCE’s role in the European 
security framework. However, when confronted with the implementation of the mission’s 
mandate, Russia was less cooperative, particularly after 1999. Moscow rejected the OSCE 
involvement in the process of conflict resolution, though the Group’s mandate clearly stated 
its role as a mediator. Russia wanted the OSCE Group to concentrate on the distribution of 
humanitarian aid and the resettlement of refugees, leaving aside the political settlement of the 
conflict.  
Repeated calls both from the Assistance Group and from the OSCE headquarters for the 
ceasing of hostilities, the conduct of negotiations and the finding of a political solution to the 
conflict have met Russian resistance. While negotiations with Chechen officials have taken 
place, Moscow continues to argue that the separatists are terrorists and that unless they 
surrender their armaments there cannot be a solution. “I would like to stress here that a lasting 
peace in the Chechen republic and so-called peace talks with the bandits are not the same 
thing, and I would ask everyone to make no mistake about that. There will be no talks with 
bandits and murderers. We want peace and a political solution to the situation in Chechnya. 
To achieve this, there has to be complete elimination of the gangs, eradication of the terrorists 
or their prosecution”.8 Later, this idea was reinforced. Nikolai Britvin, Deputy Representative 
for Southern Russia argued that “those people, including the OSCE, who are talking today 
about the necessity for political dialogue with the insurgent leaders are either short-sighted or 
have ulterior motives”.9 According to Russian Foreign Ministry sources, “the OSCE can play 
a certain positive role in resolving the [Chechen] conflict, but only after the ‘anti-terrorist’ 
operation in Chechnya has been brought to a successful conclusion”.10 For the Russian 
government, the Chechen issue is an internal matter; international mediation between a state 
and one of its “subjects” does not make sense. It is fighting terrorism in Chechnya as it would 
in any town in the Russian Federation. September 11 further added to these claims, 
perpetuating the discourse. Defence Minister Sergei Ivanov has argued that ”whoever hopes 
we will start negotiations, let them go and start negotiating with Osama bin Laden or Mullah 
                                                          
8
 Boris Yeltsin’s speech at the OSCE Istanbul Summit, 18 November 1999. 
9
 OSCE Newsletter, Vol. 9, No. 2, February 2002, p. 17. 
10
 “Moscow equivocal on OSCE Chechen role”, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), 24 November 
1999. 
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Omar”. A statement further sustained by Putin’s remark that “Russia does not negotiate with 
terrorists; it destroys them”.11 
Despite Russian claims, given the proportions the conflict has assumed, namely the 
displacement of thousands of Chechens, the OSCE considers the situation a matter of 
international concern, as evinced in Istanbul and other meetings, where Russia was not spared 
criticism. The OSCE states clearly condemned all forms of terrorism, but underscored the 
need for respecting OSCE norms, particularly with regard to international standards on human 
rights and humanitarian law. Moreover, the OSCE has repeatedly asked its member states not 
to use the fight against terrorism as an excuse for human rights violations. If Russian goals of 
fighting terrorism are legitimate, the means are by far exceeding the needs, which has been a 
cause of concern for the international community. Nevertheless, despite repeated appeals for 
the cessation of violence and violations in Chechnya, the international community has 
remained mostly inactive. Pressure over Moscow should focus not only on human rights, but 
also encompass concrete measures, such as economic sanctions while these infringements 
persist. However, the west does not seem willing to put real pressure on Moscow, opting 
instead for a minimal commitment relationship where a good understanding with Russia is 
understood as best serving everyone’s interests. “Even during the first war against Chechnya 
in 1995, the west routinely transferred billions of dollars and practically paid for the military 
operations – a capital political mistake and a crude moral violation”.12 
Despite this western posture, Moscow has charged the OSCE states, including western 
countries, of applying double-standards, i.e. of addressing similar issues with different tools. 
“The functional and geographical imbalances of OSCE activities are no longer acceptable to 
Russia, nor are the double standards in relation to the problems of Chechen terrorism and 
terrorism in other regions of the world”.13 However, this double standards matter also applies 
to Moscow, which has been playing the OSCE card at its will, making the bets according to 
its own interests. The adoption within the OSCE framework of the Code of Conduct on 
Politico-Military Aspects of Security14 and its almost immediate violation by Russia is an 
example of how Russia gambles with the OSCE, not always in a positive sense.  
Only a few days after the adoption of the document, Russia invaded Chechnya, clearly 
violating the provisions contained in paragraph 36.15 The Code sets the principles guiding the 
role of the armed forces in democratic societies and ruling relations among states in the 
military field, thus making the link between the politico-military sphere and the normative 
standards of the human dimension of the OSCE. It should be understood as a monitoring and 
investigative instrument to uncover violation of the OSCE principles, since non-compliance 
may indicate an uncooperative spirit, as in the case of the Russian intervention in Chechnya. 
Russia justified intervention as the normal processing of OSCE principles. According to the 
Russian arguments, the Code allowed states not to tolerate armed criminal gangs operating 
within their territory outside of the regularly constituted authorities. From the moment these 
forces ran out of the control of the Chechen authorities, then the resort to armed force was 
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 Ivanov and Putin cited in Dmitri Litvinovich, “Russia: the dead and the missing”, Transitions, 10 February 
2004. 
12
 “The west pays and keeps silent”, Sueddeutsche Zeitung, 19 October 1999. 
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 Russian Foreign Minister Ivanov address at the OSCE 9th Ministerial Council, Bucharest, 4 December 2001. 
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 “Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security”, Budapest Document 1994, Budapest Decisions, 
chapter IV. 
15
 “If recourse to force cannot be avoided in performing internal security missions, each participating state will 
ensure that its use must be commensurate with the needs for enforcement. The armed forces will take due care to 
avoid injury to civilians or their property”, Code of Conduct, section VIII, paragraph 36. 
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legitimate. According to Russian officials, since Chechnya was a Russian internal matter there 
was no need or reason for international involvement. The Russian interpretation revealed the 
appliance of the Code in a distorted way, in order not to contradict Russian interests. Due to 
the associated misinterpretation, the Russian positioning raised consternation, since the Code 
was sanctioning the violation of agreed norms and allowing the use of force as the primary 
means to resolve problems, which were clearly contradictory aims to those formulated in the 
Code. 
Russian criticism has also focused on the international information with regard to the 
humanitarian situation in Chechnya, which carries an “automatic minus sign for Russia”.16 
The OSCE has maintained pressure regarding human violations in the republic stressing these 
at the organisation’s meetings. However, its silent reply to Russian official comments such as 
“we do not need external observers” clearly demonstrates the extent to which Russia limits 
the OSCE involvement and action in places like Chechnya. Nevertheless, both OSCE and 
independent reports coming from the republic continuously stress arbitrary detentions during 
raids, looting, physical abuse of villagers, extra-judicial executions, beatings, torture and other 
barbaric and inhumane acts committed by Russian and pro-Russian forces in the republic.17  
With the amelioration of conditions in the field, eventually allowing minimum security 
guarantees for international observers, the OSCE has maintained pressure on the Russian 
Federation for the return of its observers to the field. In April 2000 Russia agreed on the 
return of the OSCE Assistance Group to work within the framework of its 1995 mandate, with 
special emphasis on humanitarian projects, in collaboration with the Special Representative of 
the Russian President for Human Rights. The Group would also concentrate on economic and 
environmental problems and offered support to facilitate a political solution. Nevertheless, by 
the end of 2000 there were no explicit moves to allow the return of the OSCE officers. 
Negotiations restarted in March 2001, and the Russian Ministry of Justice was made 
responsible for providing the necessary security guarantees. The Assistance Group was 
allowed to return to Chechnya in June 2001 (to Znamenskoye, in the northern part of the 
country). With the aim of pursuing the principles stated in its 1995 mandate, the Group’s 
return was understood as a major breakthrough. In the words of Chairman Mircea Geoana, 
“an important phase of our effort has ended. The most difficult is yet to come. The OSCE 
Assistance Group stands ready to facilitate a political settlement of the crisis”.18 Once the 
OSCE office was reopened, the Group started receiving requests for assistance concerning 
missing people and engaged in the delivery of humanitarian aid, besides the implementation 
of projects, particularly directed at children and young people with the aim of supporting the 
post-conflict social, psychological and professional rehabilitation of victims. 
However, despite the Russian consent to the Group’s return, Moscow has shown 
discontent towards the OSCE approach as “stirring up passions on the subject of the separatist 
republic instead of handling useful humanitarian projects”. Moreover, Russia wanted the 
OSCE mission to be withdrawn from Chechnya by the end of 2002, and that the Group’s 
activity should be confined to the coordination of humanitarian assistance, including the 
                                                          
16
 N. P. Koshman, Deputy Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation and its Plenipotentiary 
Representative in the Chechen Republic address to the OSCE Permanent Council. OSCE Newsletter, Vol. 7, No. 
3, March 2000, p. 10. 
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 “Russian Federation/Chechnya: Human rights concerns for the 61st Session of the United Nations Commission 
on Human Rights”, Human Rights Watch; Brian G. Williams, “Chechnya: an open wound”, Transitions, 31 July 
2004; Alexander Cherkasov and Tanya Lokshina, “Chechnya: 10 years of armed conflict”, Helsinki Monitor, 
Vol. 16, No. 2 (2005), p. 144. 
18
 “OSCE back in Chechnya: A major breakthrough”, OSCE Press Release, 15 June 2001. 
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return of displaced persons. According to Russian sources, the political component of the 
OSCE Group mandate had been fulfilled in its entirety.19 The restrictions imposed on the 
Group’s activity reveal the contradictions in Russian policy-making. While accepting the 
OSCE’s involvement to appease the international community and possibly prevent other 
international organisations from taking the lead, Russia objects to a relevant role of the OSCE 
in the field, since it interferes directly with its activities and restrictive policies in the area. 
The lack of agreement between the OSCE states and Russia on the renovation of the 
Assistance Group’s mandate led to the cessation of its activities on 31 December 2002 (the 
OSCE office was closed the following March). Basically, Moscow wanted to narrow the 
Group’s tasks, limiting its activities to humanitarian, economic and environmental issues. The 
Russian arguments found resistance in the OSCE consensus formula, preventing the reach of 
agreement and leading to the end of the Group’s activities in the republic, regretted by OSCE 
officials. “It is important for the OSCE to have a presence in Chechnya, with a broad mandate 
(…). If the OSCE can continue its work in Chechnya in a way that is acceptable to all parties, 
this can contribute to reducing instability, insecurity and lawlessness”.20 A position not shared 
by Russian officials. In the words of Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov, “the OSCE failed 
to assess the new reality in the breakaway republic, where the situation is returning to 
normal”, adding that Moscow was preparing a referendum on a new constitution and new 
presidential elections in the Chechen republic.21  
Showing a cooperative stance, the Russian authorities invited a team of experts from the 
OSCE and the Council of Europe to visit the republic and assess the preparations for the 
referendum, regarded as a “testimony to the openness of Russia for constructive cooperation 
with international organisations in Chechnya”.22 Despite considering the referendum as a first 
step for the resolution of the conflict through political reconciliation, the OSCE drew attention 
to the fact that “deep scepticism” prevailed among members of civil society, not constituting a 
favourable indicator. With regard to the referendum’s results, the OSCE was lukewarm on the 
vote, saying it remained uncertain whether it would bring peace, demonstrating a cautious 
approach.23 The October 2003 presidential election, which the OSCE did not monitor due to 
the many illegalities involving the process, resulting in more than 80% of the votes favourable 
to Akhmed Kadyrov, the new pro-Kremlin Chechen President, seemed to point at Moscow’s 
option for an imposed settlement.24 And in fact, Kadyrov’s policy of “Chechenisation” was 
characterised by the operation of militias and the usual brutal practices of murders, kidnaps 
and generalised terror. While managing to impose some order in the republic, the situation is 
far from “normality” and comments about the crisis belonging to the past25 sound over-
optimistic. The assassination of Akhmed Kadyrov on 9 May 2004 is not a good augury. By 
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 Attachment to PC.DEC/454/Corr.2, Interpretative Statement by the delegation of the Russian Federation under 
paragraph 79 (chapter 6) of the Final Recommendations of the Helsinki Consultations/Corrected reissue. 
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 OSCE Chairman-in-Office Jaap de Hoop Scheffer cited in “OSCE Chairman regrets end of OSCE mandate in 
Chechnya”, OSCE Press Release, 3 January 2003. 
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 “Caucasus: OSCE closes Chechnya mission with little protest”, RFE/RL, 5 January 2003. 
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 “On the trip made to Russia by OSCE ODIHR and Council of Europe experts to assess preparations for a 
referendum in Chechnya”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Daily News Bulletin, 4 March 
2003. 
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 Preliminary Statement of the Joint Assessment Mission – OSCE ODIHR and Council of Europe – To the 
Chechen Republic of the Russian Federation, 3 March 2003. 
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 “Russian Federation is ‘strong advocate’ of OSCE cause”, Interview with Alexander Alekseyev, Head of 
Delegation of the Russian Federation to the OSCE from August 2001 to early 2004. OSCE Magazine, Vol. 1, 
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the end of August 2004, Alu Alkhanov was elected Chechen President, in a non-transparent 
ballot with the tacit approval of the Kremlin. An unknown leader and submissive to Moscow, 
the election of Alkhanov does not promise substantial changes in the political (mis)dealings 
of the problem. In addition, the discourse about normalisation does not allow room for 
international involvement, with Moscow repeatedly stressing the war is over, and that the 
incidents and squeamishness taking place from time to time are just normal and falling within 
the competencies and experience of the local authorities.  
The Chechens did not demonstrate discontent towards the ending of the OSCE activities 
in the republic arguing the Group was inactive and that repeated complaints from the Chechen 
side against human rights abuses were ignored. For example, when addressed by Chechen 
Foreign Minister Ilyas Akhmadov to send observers to Chechen villages attacked by Russian 
forces, in order to witness the level of destruction and the disrespect for human rights, the 
OSCE Group stayed still and remained silent. This inaction generated wide criticism. “No 
real-politic factors, however sound they are, can justify the fact that the OSCE and the 
Council of Europe, whose officers are situated less than 50 kilometres from those helpless 
civilians (…), refused to visit the ‘mopped-up’ towns. The international community seems to 
have forgotten that a silence is a tacit consent, and that a consent, even a tacit one, is still an 
approval”.26 Comments about “[t]he myth of the OSCE presence [being] finally over – thank 
God”,27 added to criticism. The Chairman of the Committee of National Salvation, an NGO in 
the republic, who argued that there is no sense in having “such a poorly functioning, invisible, 
inactive organisation in Chechnya”,28 shared these concerns. Nevertheless, and despite the 
difficult conditions in the field, the OSCE has been trying to renegotiate with Russia its 
return. The organisation would like to engage in a long-term programme of technical 
cooperation, addressing the real needs of the republic, based on its expertise and experience. 
Talks have not produced visible results though, since Russia sees no point in a renewed 
involvement of the organisation due to its lack of financial means for rebuilding and 
rehabilitation. 
The prospects for the settlement of the conflict in Chechnya are not bright. In fact, 
Moscow does not seem eager to grant independence, nor even a broad and encompassing 
autonomous status to the Chechen leadership, based on an agreement acceptable to both sides. 
According to Russian sources, a solution will only be possible through the establishment of 
local institutions according to the approved Constitution, the conferring of dynamism on the 
economy, reducing unemployment (above 70%) and poverty, and restructuring basic 
infrastructures to allow normality in daily life. The situation has changed and as most of the 
population is willing for peace, though a difficult and slow process, including corruption and 
other illicit activities that thwart progress, Russia will find the necessary grass roots support 
for the implementation of the principles and processes overwhelmingly approved by 
referendum in the republic.29 Therefore, the Russian position remains inflexible with regard to 
eventual negotiations with the secessionists on the framing of an open dialogue and the 
consideration of different options at the negotiations table. The elimination of Maskhadov is 
an evidence of this approach. The imposed solution remains on the top of the agenda. The 
existence within the Russian Federation of many groups seeking autonomy might justify the 
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Russian hard stance in order not to open precedents encouraging secessionist movements 
impossible to keep down afterwards.  
The OSCE efforts at the settlement are limited. The political character of the 
organisation’s decisions and its non-enforcing nature mean the OSCE Group might facilitate 
the conduct of dialogue, but has no concrete ways of pressuring the parties for reaching an 
agreement and for assuring compliance with the agreed measures. Probably only in the face of 
mutual exhaustion of the parties could the OSCE Group play a more significant role with 
regard to the settlement of the conflict, not letting neither side “loose their face” by accepting 
a compromise, acting then as an international guarantor. Proposals regarding a settlement on 
the basis of the Swiss cantons model have been put forward. This would allow political 
representation of the different groups, implying participation and dialogue, and eventually 
reducing competition for power and the radicalisation of positions in such a fragmented 
society. The goal would be to establish and define relationships between the cantons, and 
afterwards between these and Russia. This could reveal an interesting approach to overcome 
the protracted character of the Chechen war. However, the Russian Federation has adopted a 
tough posture both regarding negotiations with so-called “terrorists”, and towards the direct 
involvement of the OSCE in the field. The many constraints imposed on the organisation have 
led to the hampering of its efforts in the republic and ended in the retreat of the OSCE onsite 
activities.  
 
2. From words to actions: an assessment 
Today the OSCE is no longer regarded by Russia as the only vehicle for institutional dialogue 
with western organisations, as the example of the establishment of bilateral dialogue with 
NATO reveals. This might be detrimental regarding collaboration on the new security agenda, 
including the international fight against terrorism and organised crime. Nevertheless, there has 
been a tendency to favour the OSCE, which Russia sees as the primary instrument to pursue 
its aims of minimising the role of outsiders in the former Soviet area. However, if the Russian 
attempts to increase the role of the OSCE are mostly motivated by the desire to obtain 
legitimacy for its activities in the former Soviet space, then the Russian pro-OSCE orientation 
might be questioned.  
The Russian attitude towards the OSCE has not always been cooperative, shifting 
according to national interests and pressures, and in the end reflecting Russian policy-making 
contradictions. Moscow is one of the principal defenders of the OSCE, but at the same time 
one of its most controversial participants. In places like Chechnya, Russia wants the OSCE’s 
blessing but not its interference or supervision. Thus, Russia fights with ambiguity. Moscow 
has sanctioned OSCE involvement in the former Soviet Union through the consensus voting 
procedure in the organisation. This is justified by the need for international legitimacy and by 
the fact that vetoing the deployment of OSCE missions, the Russian Federation would be 
regarded with much suspicion by the other participating states. The OSCE, which has 
internationally recognised legitimacy for maintaining peace and security, has been influential 
in the former Soviet republics through its direct involvement, including preventive diplomacy, 
mediation and monitoring activities. This enlarged involvement has suggested Russian 
discontent, leading to efforts at limiting the detailing and reach of OSCE decisions. “When 
left to face Russia in what the latter considers its ex-Soviet sphere of influence… the OSCE is 
consistently failing in its tasks. The OSCE is being largely paralysed by its consensus rules, 
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which give Russia effective veto power over the organization’s decisions”.30 This has in fact 
been a severe constraint to the OSCE functioning, with Russia clearly limiting the 
organisation’s functioning, by disregarding its norms and standards, and by raising obstacles 
to its already tough decision-making process, to the point of the question being formulated: is 
the OSCE still alive?31  
Perceiving OSCE activity as an attempt to downgrade Russian involvement and influence 
in neighbouring countries, Russia has argued in favour of increased OSCE involvement in 
other areas outside the former Soviet Union. President Putin and Foreign Minister Ivanov 
have emphasised that the OSCE should treat crisis situations in the whole OSCE area in a 
balanced way.32 This has been a recurrent argument with Russian representatives criticising 
the OSCE of “biased and politicised approaches, geographical imbalances and a division 
between ‘equal’ and ‘more equal’ nations”.33 
Moscow will continue to pursue its own interests, with OSCE cooperation when possible 
and in competition with it when necessary. The ambiguous Russian position towards the 
OSCE creates contradictions in its own policies, since the limits imposed by Russia on OSCE 
normal activity add more to the organisation’s limitations in becoming the basic structure of a 
pan-European security framework, as previously envisaged by Russia. If Russia blocks the 
OSCE when its interests are at stake, Russia will have a free-hand in those cases, and the 
OSCE will be excluded, with fundamental consequences for the organisation’s credibility and 
reach, and for European security in general.  
The limits imposed by the Russian Federation on OSCE activity have been clear not only 
at the decision-making level but also in the field. In Vienna, Russia has many times prevented 
the adoption of decisions with precise and clear wording, allowing only vague formulations. 
The general wording of the field missions’ mandates is an example. While allowing ample 
scope for action, in terms of the projects to be implemented and programs to be developed, it 
also allowed room for criticisms about out-of-the-mandate initiatives, whenever the OSCE 
was dealing with critical issues, such as the political negotiations (now a non-option) or even 
the human rights situation in Chechnya. Delicate issues as regard Russian “divide-and-rule” 
policies and its economic and political interests in the near abroad (the Caucasus is an 
example), have not been openly debated in Vienna. Participating states have to address in a 
responsible manner even the most delicate issues, otherwise if they remain attached only to 
broad and general considerations, it will be hard for the organisation to respond to the real 
problems. Again, internal constraints to the organisation’s working have prevented further 
decision-making and action by the OSCE, a limitation visible in the lack of consensus for a 
return of the OSCE to the field in Chechnya.  
However, the Russian veto right over OSCE activities is not unlimited. The Russian 
Federation may exercise it at the decision-making level of the organisation in Vienna with 
possible effects in the field, but there are OSCE areas where Russia’s veto is limited. The 
OSCE agreements and norms are examples. The Russian Federation may create obstacles, but 
it cannot ignore or alter the existence of these norms and mechanisms, to which it voluntarily 
became subject. Their continuous violation is certainly a source of distrust and discredit 
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which the Kremlin must take into account. The Russian Federation and the OSCE have 
engaged in a “marriage of convenience”.34 Russia needs the OSCE as an impartial 
internationally accepted mediator, and the OSCE provides an alternative to Russian-appointed 
intermediaries who would certainly be viewed with suspicion by Russian neighbours. 
Russia’s rhetoric as regards strengthening the OSCE as a collective security framework and 
its cooperation with the OSCE in the resolution of conflicts is fundamental to avoid not only 
possible Russian hegemonic ambitions, but also any Russian feelings of exclusion. In this 
context, Russia has been balancing the advantages and costs of its more or less commitment 
within the OSCE, in order not to question its position in the former Soviet Union area, while 
simultaneously obtaining legitimacy and the western community’s sanctioning for its actions 
in the neighbouring republics. Therefore, the “give-and-take-away” game that has become 
common in the OSCE-Russia relationship, evinced in the case of Chechnya. 
Russian relations towards the OSCE are, and will probably remain, both competitive and 
cooperative according to Russian interests. Russia’s cooperative character may be influenced 
by the economic aid it is receiving from the west and to avoid discredit among its OSCE 
counterparts in the former Soviet area. Nevertheless, these factors have not revealed 
themselves as sufficiently strong to counter Russian activities, at times incongruent with the 
Helsinki principles, such as the armed intervention in Chechnya. The success of OSCE 
operations in the former Soviet space is a test to the organisation’s ability to pursue its goals, 
but it is simultaneously a test to the Russian willingness to become fully integrated in the 
international community. The pragmatic and realist policies of Vladimir Putin, which seemed 
to bring renewed attempts to solve many of the frozen conflicts in the former Soviet area, 
resulted in failure. The protracted character of the Chechen hostilities is an example. 
Uncertainty prevails and the course of Russian politics is still not clear. The OSCE, though 
not anymore in the field, will continue to monitor events in the republic, either criticising or 
applauding Russia according to its political moves and regarding its level of commitment to 
the organisation’s norms and principles. As regards the search for a political solution, most 
probably it is not so much a question of finding a new formula for an old problem, but more 
of applying political will, resolute action and balanced approaches, in other words, the old 
question of the need for political willingness and true commitment as fundamental ingredients 
for the resolution of old and new problems.  
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